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ABSTRACT 
 
The literature suggests that neighborhoods with organized criminal networks 
would have lower crime rates than other neighborhoods or communities, because of the 
social control their organization exerts on residents and visitors.  The strictly organized 
Italian-American Mafia seems to have characteristics that would translate throughout the 
neighborhood: People will not participate in overt illegal behaviors because they do not 
know who is watching, and the fear of what the Mafia might do keeps residents and 
visitors to the neighborhood relatively well-behaved.  Using crime statistics from the 
NYPD and census data for neighborhood characteristics, four linear regressions were 
calculated.  The results indicate that low socioeconomic status is the main factor 
explaining neighborhood crime rate variations in New York City.  The percent of the 
population under 18 and density were also listed as influential factors for some variables.  
The percent of foreign-born Italians was noted as significant in the correlation models, 
though it is not yet clear what this might truly indicate.  The proxy variable for Mafia 
presence was not significant, and this can either be due to inaccuracies of the 
measurement of the variable or a true decrease in the influence of Mafia presence after 
the string of RICO arrests in the 1980s and 1990s.   The results imply that Mafia presence 
does not influence neighborhood social control, but they do reinforce social 
disorganization theory.   The foundation of this theory is neighborhood stability; the more 
unstable a neighborhood is, the more susceptible the neighborhood is to crime and 
dysfunction.  Factors like low socioeconomic status and density influence neighborhood 
ii 
stability.  Future research should attempt to have more accurate representations of Mafia 
presence and neighborhood characteristics.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
According to the Johnson commission (1964): “Organized crime is a society that 
seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and their government.  It 
involves thousands of criminals, working within structures as complex as those of any 
large corporation, subject to laws more rigidly enforced than those of legitimate 
governments” (Jacobs, Panarella and Worthington, 1994, p.194).  These organizations 
can be considered anything from the grandiose Mafia families to the teen street, drug-
dealing gangs (Orvis and Rush, 2000).  Organized crime comes in many forms, but for 
the purpose of this paper, the focus will be on the Mafia, specifically Italian and Italian-
American groups also known as La Cosa Nostra.   
Shaw and McKay (1969), Suttles (1972), Hunter (1985), Sampson (1985) and 
Bursik and Grasmick (2001), among others, provide the framework for the argument that, 
despite the massive illicit dealings of the Italian-American  Mafia, the residential 
neighborhoods in which they live and work remain relatively free of delinquency and 
street crime, more so than other similar urban neighborhoods.  The underlying premise is 
straight-forward, everybody prefers to live in a safe neighborhood.  This study will 
examine the characteristics of the defended neighborhood and how they are uniquely 
applied to New York City neighborhoods, particularly the Italian-American 
neighborhood of Bensonhurst in Brooklyn.  The expectation is that Bensonhurst and 
other neighborhoods with a strong Mafia presence have significantly lower street crime 
1 
than the rest of New York City due to the influence and informal social control exerted 
by organized crime. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE DEFENDED NEIGHBORHOOD 
 
 
 
 
Suttles (1972) coined the term defended neighborhood to describe communities 
where members collectively eradicate selected delinquency and crime from their 
community.  “The residential group which seals itself off through the efforts of 
delinquent gangs, by restrictive covenants, by sharp boundaries, or by a forbidding 
reputation—what I will call the defended neighborhood—was for a time a major category 
in sociological analysis” (Suttles, 1972, p. 21). These communities are able to exert 
formal and informal social controls on community residents, on outsiders to the 
neighborhood, or on both.  The literature makes clear that four elements are necessary to 
become a successful defended neighborhood: fear, reputation, organization 
(disorganization), and social control.  The following sections will present an overview of 
these elements of defended neighborhoods. 
Fear and Reputation 
 
Personal views of a neighborhood vary; for some it might be the two block radius 
from their home, for others it might be the whole area between their job and their home, 
and for others their “neighborhood” is simply the street on which they live. However, 
there are typically general areas defined by the public and adopted by residents that are 
considered “neighborhoods.”  In several larger cities, including New York City and 
Chicago, these neighborhoods have official status and have been widely used by planning 
agencies and other municipal offices, in some cases for over a century.     
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Suttles (1972) writes, “The Neighborhood,’…has a more fixed referent and 
usually possesses a name and some sort of reputation known to persons other than the 
residents” (p.37).  This public reputation of a neighborhood is often its most important 
asset, and it is the responsibility of neighborhood residents to define and maintain this 
reputation.  If neighborhood residents desire safe streets, it is they who have to do the 
work and make the effort to keep their streets safe.  This ranges from physically stopping 
the crime to gaining influence with the police department and other local officials to help 
in crime reduction and prevention.  Whatever the means of the neighborhood, residents 
being involved is the key to a successful defense.   
For residents to become actively involved in securing their neighborhood, there 
first has to be an element of fear.  This could stem from inside or outside the 
neighborhood; but there has to be a feeling of imminent danger or “urban unease” on 
some level for people to take up the cause of their neighborhood (Boggs, 1971; Taylor 
and Hale, 1986; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Liska and Baccaglini, 1990).  Conversely, 
as citizens come together to defend their community, they must create a reputation of fear 
for the rest of the city; find a successful way to advertise their defenses, letting others 
know that if they mess with the neighborhood, there will be negative consequences 
(Suttles, 1972).1  This can be done through the social networks they create through the 
organization of the neighborhood.   
                                                 
1 Most larger cities have one or more neighborhoods with a reputation for applying negative sanctions to 
street crime, for example, Little Italy and Hampden in Baltimore, The Hill in St. Louis and Bensonhurst in 
New York City.   
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Organization 
 
Shaw and McKay (1969) created the theory of social disorganization as a way to 
explain why some neighborhoods experienced different levels of street crime and 
deterioration.  Social disorganization theory explains that the more organized the 
residents are in neighborhoods, the more social control the neighborhood experiences and 
therefore the lower the level of delinquency or street crime in the neighborhood (Shaw 
and McKay, 1969; Suttles, 1972; Kornhauser, 1979; DeSena 1994).  In other words, the 
denser the social networks in a given community, the better it can fight against overt and 
excessive street crime, delinquency, and neighborhood deterioration (Krohn 1986; 
DeSena 1994).  There is the longstanding argument that socioeconomic status affects the 
level of community stability (Whyte 1941; Shaw and McKay 1969; Kornhauser, 1979; 
Sampson and Groves, 1989). However, Whyte (1941), Suttles(1972) and Kornhauser 
(1979) discuss the fact that those with low socioeconomic status and high rates of 
delinquency do not necessarily suffer from lack of organization.  Whyte (1941) discusses 
the “Millers” and their highly organized order of operations, despite their low 
socioeconomic status (655). He notes specifically the hierarchy of the “Millers” and how 
the leaders could very easily get the members of their group to follow what they wanted 
to do.  The chain of command makes accomplishing tasks easier and more organized 
(Whyte 1941).  The neighborhoods that succeed in maintaining relatively “safe” streets, 
regardless of socioeconomic status, have been described by many as defended 
neighborhoods.   
5 
Social Control (or Networks) 
 
 Personal control is among families and friends; those who are closest to each 
other have a stronger effect on monitoring and maintaining desired behavior (Hunter, 
1985; Bursik and Grasmick, 2001).  “Within such groups, social control is usually 
achieved through the allocation or threatened withdrawal of sentiment, social support, 
and mutual esteem (p.233).”  (Bursik and Grasmick 2001:16).   Hirschi (1969), 
Kornhauser (1978) and Crutchfield et al (1982) describe family composition as an 
important factor in organizing and stabilizing a community.  Sampson (1985) writes, “It 
is suggested that areas with pronounced family disorganization are less able to provide an 
effective network of social controls.  In contrast, communities with a strong familial base 
are likely to be areas where families know each other and provide mutual support” (p. 
11).  Family composition appears to be a key factor in the defended neighborhood. 
Parochial control refers to the control that comes from schools, churches and other more 
formal institutions that expect certain behaviors from participants. Bursik and Grasmick 
(2001).clarified that “…the parochial order refers to relationships among neighbors who 
do not have the same sentimental attachment” (2001:17).  Finally public control comes 
from the police department and other government agencies.  “The second, and perhaps 
most important, external resource concerning the control of crime concerns the 
relationships that exist between the neighborhood and the police department of the city in 
which it is located” (Bursik and Grasmick  2001 P. 17). A defended neighborhood is at its 
strongest if all three of these aspects of control are maintained.  Neighborhoods that have 
strong family composition, solid public schools and a decent amount of local tax money 
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to support their police department have a stronger defense against delinquency and street 
crime than those neighborhoods with none or only one of the three P’s of social control 
discussed by Hunter (1985).  “Hence, the greater density of networks among persons in a 
community, the greater the constraint on deviant behavior within the purview of the 
social network” (Krohn 1986, p. 84).  The more connected a neighborhood is through 
social networks, the more social control that neighborhood will have.  The more 
influence a community has in all areas, Personal, Parochial and Public control, the 
greater the chances are of successful defense against street crime and delinquency.   
Socioeconomics 
 
There are no consistent socioeconomic characteristics of a defended neighborhood.  Shaw 
and McKay([1942]1969) focused on the socioeconomic aspect of social organization as 
did Suttles (1972) and Kornhauser(1979), but in the latter works it becomes clear that 
SES may not be a very good predictor of how well a neighborhood is defended. Those 
that have more money can afford more Public control and probably more Parochial 
control, but neighborhoods with any level of SES can achieve familial or Personal 
control. There are accounts of lower-class neighborhoods being defended by women and 
street gangs, but this is rare among those who are less economically endowed (Shaw and 
Mckay [1942] 1969; Suttles 1972; Patillo 1998 ).  In either case, a part of creating 
neighborhood safety involves citizens organized in some type of social network willing to 
actively work toward eradicating the presence of street crime in their neighborhood 
(Suttles 1972; Kornhauser 1979; Krohn 1986; McIllwain 1999).   
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“In a very real sense, many of our slum communities in large cities come to 
approximate warrior societies because they must perform so much of their own policing 
and other functions which are ostensibly the responsibility of public institutions” (Suttles, 
1972, p.191).  Those of lower SES are many times more tightly networked than those 
who have more of an economic advantage, and they will personally fight for the 
neighborhood; taking up where the government leaves off. “Thus in these defended 
communities, a significant amount of delinquency did not represent internal social 
disorganization but organized responses to perceived external threats”(Heitgard and 
Bursik, 1987, p. 785).   Moreover, if a slum neighborhood has a reputation for violence or 
other street crime, it lowers the likelihood that outsiders will enter their territory; 
delinquency in one’s own neighborhood can be a deterrent.  
 Neighborhoods with a higher SES may be able to afford the outside Public and 
Parochial control but they might not have strong Personal networks.  “The segmental 
character of urban life leaves only some people free some of the time to invest their 
energy and interests into the defended neighborhood” (Suttles, 1972, p. 37). Most often 
the best defended neighborhoods are middle to upper class because they can better afford 
to have the political and social connections to enforce rules about street behavior.  
Women of wealthier families can stay home and keep a look out in the neighborhood 
(Desena 1994).  DeSena (1994) discusses the neighborhood of Greenpoint in Brooklyn, 
New York.  The women of this neighborhood keep very close tabs on all of the social 
action and closely monitor who they allow into the neighborhood by tightly controlling 
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the rental and sale of property.  They have established a tight social network and use this 
network to aid in protecting the neighborhood (DeSena, 1994).   
 Basically, high socioeconomic status can help, but it is not the only indicator of a 
defended neighborhood.  The literature has pointed to several different indicators of the 
defended neighborhood, but what if all of those indicators were present at the same time?   
For a neighborhood to have the best defense it must have the elements of fear, 
reputation, social organization, and social control.  At least some neighborhoods with a 
heavy presence of the Italian-American Mafia seem to possess all of these characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 2: LA COSA NOSTRA: THE FIVE FAMILIES OF NEW 
YORK CITY’S ITALIAN-AMERICAN MAFIA 
 
 
 
 
La Cosa Nostra or “this thing of ours” is the slang term for those involved in 
Sicilian crime families known more widely as “the Mafia.”(Maas, 1999;Orvis and Rush, 
2000; DeStefano, 2007).  Beginning in the 19th century in Sicily as a way to protect 
citizens from unstable and unfair government, the U.S. American Mafia is a collection of 
Italian immigrants who opted for bootlegging and other black market dealings rather than 
the janitorial and unpleasant jobs typically held by immigrants (Maas, 1999; DeStefano, 
2007).  These bootlegging organizations have strong roots in family and are intricately 
organized (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972; Block and Chambliss, 1981;). Traditionally, 
there is a strict code by which all members of the organization must live or they must 
undergo, usually severe, punishment —the code is referred to as Omerta, meaning honor.  
Living by the Omerta means that you never talk about the organization or sell out the 
organization by giving away information (Maas, 1999; DeStefano, 2007).   For the most 
part the Omerta works; it was not until the 1980s that people began to work as informants 
for the FBI, breaking the sacred code of honor (Jacobs et al., 1994). 
The La Cosa Nostra grew fast in the United States during prohibition; there was 
plenty of opportunity to make a lot of money with little risk, but most of their dealings 
are far from upstanding(Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972;Block, 1980; Block and Chambliss 
1981). The Mafia grows strong roots in society through extortion and bribery and for 
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some time even the FBI denied its existence for fear of retaliation. Until the 1980s there 
was no massive crack down on Mafia operations (Jacobs et al, 1994).  Many believe that 
the Mafia is no longer operating or that it never was in the first place; but if you read the 
news it becomes obvious that that is not true, there are several recent articles that discuss 
the many current operations of the Italian-American Mafia (AP 2007).  Further, the Mafia 
always has replacements ready when other members die or go to jail.  The organization is 
set up to keep renewing itself no matter what happens (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972; 
Maas, 1999).  The Italian-American Mafia has a strong organization and network that 
enables them to withstand the many law enforcement and social challenges, below we 
will see how these characteristics spill over into the neighborhoods in which they live.  
Characteristics of the Defended Mafia Neighborhood 
Italian-American Mafia neighborhoods possess all of the characteristics suggested for a 
defended neighborhood: fear, reputation, organization, and social control.2  
The Fear 
Fear is essentially the driving force for neighborhood organization and social control 
(networks) and the La Cosa Nostra represents fear (Boggs, 1971; Skogan and Maxfield, 
1981; Taylor and Hale, 1986; Liska and Baccaglini, 1990).  It is common knowledge that 
you will be killed if you do the wrong thing inside a neighborhood controlled by the 
Mafia, this fear of immediate and permanent punishment deters residents and outside 
street criminals from acting out.  Suttles (1972), discusses Chicago’s Mafia, better known 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that not all cities have a branch of La Cosa Nostra.  There is a general consensus 
that the strongest Mafia families are found in New York City and Chicago. 
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as the “Outfit,” and explains that “the Italian boys, as well as the Mexican, Puerto Rican, 
and black ones, tended to behave rather gingerly when in the presence of their Italian 
male elders.  Rumor had it that many of the Italian males had ready access to professional 
‘skullers’ and could carry out heavy handed retaliation against anyone who challenged 
their authority or dignity” (Suttles, 1972, p.202).  This is one of many examples where 
the social network of the Mafia has stabilized its reputation for violence, rumors can have 
a profound effect on the behavior of people in particular neighborhoods, although they 
may not be completely based in reality. 
The Reputation 
 
The Italian-American Mafia has a notorious reputation for retaliating against 
those who cross them by making them “disappear.”  The Mafia have many personal and 
political connections that it is easy for them to quietly end a person’s life.  This idea is 
reinforced by films like the Godfather, Goodfellas, Casino and even Dick Tracy.  
Without even coming in contact with the Mafia, the general public already has a 
preconceived idea about the Mafia based on media representation.  This perception is 
mildly accurate because the Mafia really is tightly organized and networked (Ianni and 
Reuss-Ianni ,1972; McIllwain, 1999; DeStefano, 2007).   
The network density of the Mafia is so strong that it extends far beyond adjacent 
neighborhoods; all five New York City Boroughs are aware of the Mafia presence in 
Bensonhurst and other sections of the city (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni ,1972; McIllwain, 
1999; DeStefano, 2007).  The Mafia not only put their roots in their neighborhoods, but 
they tend to take over government business and local industry; garbage trucks, 
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construction, the garment district, and the waterfront in Manhattan.   As the Mafia get 
deeply involved with a city both financially and physically, more and more people 
become an indirect part of “this thing of ours” (Block, 1980; Maas, 1999).  “People who 
understood power and ‘the way things were’ recognized the Mafia as a force in politics 
vice and legitimate business including shipping, trucking, garbage disposal and the 
garment district” (Jacobs et al, 1994).  Members of the organization get elected to 
government offices and take jobs in the police department to make things like bribery, 
extortion and other crimes a bit easier, but it also allows for protection from the 
government and the police department, which aids in the reduction of street crime 
(DeStefano, 2007).  The Mafia is rarely questioned or opposed by local law enforcement; 
they achieve this usually through bribery (Jacobs et al, 1994).  “Remarkably, until well 
into the 1960s the FBI, under the leadership of J. Edgar Hoover, disputed the very 
existence of an American Mafia” (Jacobs et al, 1994, p. 45). Finally the element of fear 
that the Mafia carries elevates the neighborhood to an even higher defended status.  Not 
only do people in the neighborhood behave, people outside the neighborhood behave 
according to the regulations set forth by the organization.  "People fear the violence, 
because it often spills over and hurts innocent bystanders. But at the same time, people 
give the mob credit for occasionally mediating in community disputes and for enforcing a 
certain set of rules on the street” (Dillon, 1992, p. 35).   In neighborhoods defended by 
street gangs, outsiders can see what they are up against, but in Mafia neighborhoods 
everything is behind closed doors.  The tall tales and the true stories that float around 
13 
about the Mafia keep up this reputation even if they come or go in a neighborhood 
(Suttles, 1972). 
The Organization 
 
The Mafia organized their families and their businesses under strict rules and 
codes and because of their social networking skills, these rules and codes often spill over 
into their neighborhoods.  The strict code of rules applies to their families and 
organization but also in the neighborhood they choose to live or work in (Ianni and 
Reuss-Ianni, 1972; Block, 1980). Criminologist James Jacobs from NYU also believes 
that the Mafia and other organized criminal activities can make a neighborhood safer 
(DeStefano 2007). DeStefano held an interview with James Jacobs in New York City in 
May, 2002.  During the interview Jacobs said “Mafiosi were a force for stability in 
neighborhoods…They wanted to live in safe neighborhoods, and because they had a 
reputation for violence and a willingness to use violence, the neighborhoods in which 
they had presence were safe” (DeStefano, 2007, p.60).  The vast organization and social 
network that the Mafia constructed is responsible for social control through its reputation, 
both real and rumored, for retaliation. 
The Social Control 
 
Another important detail of the defended Mafia neighborhoods is the emphasis on 
family values.  Previously noted, family composition can be a significant predictor of 
social disorganization, and is most likely a significant factor in the organization of the 
Mafia and their neighborhoods (Sampson 1985; Sampson and Groves, 1989; McIllwain, 
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1999).  The Mafia home life builds this Personal control through emphasis on respect 
and trust.  Because heritage is one of the most important elements of La Cosa Nostra 
(you cannot be considered for full membership if you are not Italian), more people 
involved in the organization carry the same family and religious values (Ianni and Reuss-
Ianni, 1972; Maas, 1999; DeStefano, 2007).  This makes it easier for the family values to 
cross over into the neighborhood; it is not solely fear that drives the organization; strong 
family values aid in creating a successfully defended neighborhood.   
The neighborhoods that are home to the Mafia make trade offs with residents so 
that their illegal business behind closed doors will not be of concern; providing safety for 
residents is one of the benefits of looking the other way in the presence of their illegal 
enterprise.  The social network of the Mafia extends far beyond their tiny neighborhood.  
“Network density refers to the extent to which all actors in a social network are 
connected by direct relations.  When network density is high, the ability to control 
delinquency is increased because the behavior of participants in such a network is 
potentially subject to the reactions of all network members” (Sampson and Groves, 1989, 
p.779). Mcillwain (1999) discusses social networking as a new framework for 
understanding organized crime; the criminal organizations are successful on the large 
scale because they are so tightly networked.  James Jacobs explains “So, the Mafia was 
functional.  That’s why it lasted so long, why it was so powerful, because it served 
needs.”(DeStefano, 2007, p.61). 
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CHAPTER 3: THE BENSONHURST NEIGHBORHOOD 
 
 
 
 
The focus on the New York City neighborhood of Bensonhurst and the influence 
of the Mafia presence in the neighborhood stems from approximately four years of 
personal residence in the area. While I was looking for an apartment in Brooklyn, people 
told me to pay attention to the cars parked on the street because this was considered an 
indicator of neighborhood safety.  On my street in Bensonhurst, people parked their 
Jaguars without a second thought, the neighbors left their front doors unlocked, and 
police cars were practically nonexistent.  These things struck me as odd; it just did not 
seem possible that, in New York City, a place that quickly trains you to keep tabs on all 
personal belongings, people do not garage their Jaguars or lock their doors and there are 
not police cars every two or three blocks. After spending enough time in Bensonhurst, 
deli owners, old women on their front porch, men at the Laundromat started to talk, and I 
began to realize that the Mafia also had a strong presence in the neighborhood.  Joe, the 
corner deli guy, told me that all of the deli ATM cash machines were owned by the Mafia 
and that they would not allow him to have one in his deli.  I may never know if what Joe 
said was actually true, but I do know that this as not the first or last time I heard mention 
of the Mafia in that neighborhood.  During my stay in Bensonhurst, I always attributed 
my safety to the presence of the Mafia.  
16 
The elements to a successful defended neighborhood are fear, reputation 
organization, social control or networks (including elements of the three P’s).  The 
neighborhoods of the Italian-American Mafia or La Cosa Nostra meet, and often excel, at 
all four elements and therefore maintain the safest neighborhoods.  Bensonhurst is a good 
example of a Mafia neighborhood with the type of defense described in this paper.   
Fear and Reputation 
The Mafia in Bensonhurst are so tightly networked that it translates into the 
neighborhood network.  Everyone begins to share the Omerta; the rules of the Mafia 
become the neighborhood rules and the vow of silence becomes the vow of the 
neighborhood (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972; Block, 1980).  “Perhaps the most subtle 
structural feature of the defended neighborhood is its shared knowledge or what might be 
called its underlife”(Suttles,1972, p. 36).  Lori Geli, a 28 year old mother and resident 
among the Brooklyn mob neighborhoods says "We don't like dead bodies, with holes in 
their heads, turning up in front of our homes, but in a way the Mafia keeps the 
neighborhood safe. There aren't half as many burglaries here as in other places. So their 
presence is kind of good because they give a kind of fear to other people" (Dillon, 1992, 
p.35).  There is an exchange of respect and trust in Bensonhurst. “Trust is used here in 
this third sense, as a social relationship in which principals—for whatever reason or state 
of mind—invest resources, authority, or responsibility in another to act on their behalf for 
some uncertain future return…”(Shapiro, 1987, p. 653). 
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Organization and Social Control 
Bensonhurst is the kind of neighborhood where kids sled in the streets in the winter and 
play in the water from the fire hydrants in the summer.  “In Bensonhurst everyone knows 
everyone else on every block.  Its mainly blue-collar residents are insular, closemouthed 
and suspicious of outsiders.  Strangers are remarked on at once.  As a result, the rate of 
common street crimes—rapes, robberies, felony assaults—is low compared to other parts 
of the city, according to police statistics.  Murder is a third less than the citywide 
average” (Maas, 1999, p.2).  The values and ideals upheld by La Cosa Nostra in 
Bensonhurst have persisted over time and have penetrated the community. “Cultural 
theory suggests that once beliefs, values, ideas and ideologies become norms in a macro 
unit, they can persist over time and generations through the normal process of 
socialization.  To some extent, beliefs and fear of crime may also be part of the 
socialization process” (Liska and Baccaglini, 1990, p. 361).   
Residents of Bensonhurst are fully aware of the Mafia presence in their 
neighborhood and the majority of those living there do not mind (Bohlen, 1989; Dillon, 
1992).  For them it is extra security; the same kind of security that the Mafia was initiated 
for back in Sicily; protection for those who cannot protect themselves.  Despite the vast 
underworld of criminal activity, Bensonhurst was and is one of the safest neighborhoods 
in all of New York City.  The infamous “Five Families” of the American Italian Mafia 
call Bensonhurst in south Brooklyn home. The Gambino, Columbo, Bonnano, Genovese, 
and Luchese families operate throughout New York City, but are densely located in 
South Brooklyn (Bohlen, 1989; Dillon, 1992; De Stefano, 2007).  Occupying about two 
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square miles, the neighborhood of Bensonhurst is a relatively quiet suburban area. 
(Bohlen, 1989).  Howard Feur, district manager of the community board for Bensonhurst 
says “It is not uncommon for people to have lived here all their lives, for their parents to 
have lived here before them. These are people who are happy in their community…The 
biggest problem’ is the subways, they don’t run on time” (Bohlen, 1989, p.A1). There is 
the occasional elevated train that passes but mostly the noise and city chaos are off in the 
distance.  Almost entirely two family homes, the majority of front yards are adorned with 
wrought iron gates and various religious statues (Bohlen, 1989; DeStefano 2007).  This 
neighborhood is extremely family oriented and knowing the neighbors is a must in this 
area (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972; Maas, 1999; DeStefano, 2007).   
The sense of family and community in Bensonhurst has persisted over time, and 
has been described as unchanged since the 1950s.  This could explain the ability of the 
neighborhood to have such dense social networks and strong social control.  The 
neighborhood has had decades to develop and maintain its reputation of quiet streets but 
underground fear.  Bensonhurst has strong organization and social networks; the strong 
reputation for violence creates fear and deters delinquency and street crime. Bensonhurst 
is one of the most effective defended neighborhoods, because it is not missing any of the 
necessary elements needed for a successfully defended neighborhood.   
In order to conduct a more quantitative test of the hypothesis that Mafia 
neighborhoods in New York City have lower levels of street crime than others with 
similar socioeconomic characteristics, the next section of the paper analyzes assault, 
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homicide and robbery rates for the New York City community districts circa 2000.  As 
will be discussed below, there is a difficulty in undertaking this type of analysis because 
there is a lack of a reliable measure for Mafia presence or influence at any level.  Because 
the Mafia has been increasingly disrupted by informants during the past two decades, 
their presence can begin to be approximated by using arrest records. However, even this 
method is not an accurate measure of Mafia presence because it only assesses those 
members who get caught, not all Mafia members.  There are no membership lists or end 
of the year financial records for New York City Mafia families, and this makes it difficult 
to precisely measure Mafia presence.   
Russian organized crime, typically referred to as the Russian Mafia, is another 
predominant crime group in the United States and New York City (Shelley, 1995; 
Finkenhauer and Waring, 1998).  Russian organized crime is not considered to be as 
organized as the Italian-American Mafia because they do not have any typical order of 
operation and they have many small groups rather than one large group.  However, the 
impact of their many organizations has harmed many on a global scale as well as locally 
in New York City (Shelley, 1995; Finckenhauer and Waring, 1998).  Because Russian 
organized crime is well-known in the United States and New York City, it will be used as 
a measure of mafia presence in the final analysis.  This will allow for a broader picture of 
the effects of organized crime that is not specifically Italian.   
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODS 
 
 
 
 
The best way to study a neighborhood is through observation and 
interview/survey, as we have seen through the work of Park and Burgess (1925), Suttles 
(1972), DeSena (1994), Patillo (1998) and the like. However, there are three reasons why 
this project will not use the preferred method.  First, there are time constraints.  Second, 
due to the nature of the topic, there would probably be an overwhelming unwillingness to 
talk by residents.  Lastly, the Mafia has been depicted so frequently in movies and 
television that there is a likelihood of exaggerated responses.  Instead of interviewing 
New York City residents, this part of the thesis will analyze secondary data collected by 
government agencies. 
Specifically, to take a closer look at the influence of Mafia presence on 
neighborhood levels of crime, I turned to two data sources: the United States Census 
Bureau and the New York City Police Department.   
Independent Variables 
 
 Data from the Census Bureau were retrieved from the New York City Department 
of City Planning for the year 2000 for each New York City community district.  The 
purpose of collecting these data is to show the neighborhood characteristics that are 
commonly associated with neighborhood public safety.  The reason community districts 
were chosen rather than census tracts or neighborhoods are three fold. Because this study 
is preliminary, first the larger community districts will be analyzed and, if the results 
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warrant further investigation, a more detailed study of census tracts or neighborhoods 
will be conducted.  Additionally, it is important to consider that census tracts are much 
smaller than neighborhoods and this may misrepresent communities, especially in an 
urban area as dense as New York City.  Instead, community districts will be viewed as 
neighborhoods to achieve the same effects.   
Each community district is approximately 1-2 square miles with populations 
between 50,000 and 200,000 (NYCDCP 2008).  Each of the five boroughs are divided 
into multiple community districts: Brooklyn is divided into districts 1-18, Queens has 
districts 1-14, Manhattan separates into districts 1-12, the Bronx also has districts 1-12, 
and Staten Island has community districts 1-3.  This totals 59 community districts.3  
 The neighborhood characteristics collected from these community districts and 
included in the data seta are % Russian foreign-born, % Italian foreign-born, % on public 
assistance, population density, % female headed households with dependent children, 
population change from 1990-2000, median income, % owner occupied housing, % 
education of high school or higher, and % of those under 18.  These variables were 
chosen because they are commonly discussed in criminology and sociology as influential 
on neighborhood public safety (Park and Burgess, 1925; Shaw and McKay, 1969; 
DeSena, 1994; Patillo, 1998; Bursik and Grasmik, 2001).  They were available in the 
community district profiles compiled by the New York City Department of City 
Planning.  
                                                 
3 Community districts in New York City have been previously used in scholarly research (Golub, Johnson 
and Dunlap 2006). 
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The Percent of households on public assistance was chosen as a variable to measure 
socio-economic status.  Population Density was chosen as a variable because crime rises 
with the number of people in an area; typically, the higher the density, the more crimes 
will occur.  The Percent of Female Headed Households with Dependent Children was 
also chosen to be an indicator of low socio-economic status.  Population Change from 
1990-2000 was chosen because social disorganization theory suggests higher mobility 
(moving in and out frequently) can lead to higher crime rates.  Median Income was 
obviously chosen as an indicator of socio-economic status.  The Percent owner occupied 
housing was chosen to indicate socio-economic status.   The Percent Education of high 
school or higher was also chosen as an indicator of socio-economic status.  The Percent 
of population under 18 was selected as people under the age of 18 are more susceptible to 
becoming involved in criminal activity.  The following variables were available in 
percentages from the Census Bureau: Russian foreign-born, Italian foreign-born, public 
assistance, owner occupied housing and high school or higher. The percent of female-
headed households and the % of the population under 18 were calculated by the author.  
Percent of female-headed households was calculated by dividing the number of female 
headed households by the total number of households in the district.  The percent of 
people under the age of 18 was calculated by dividing the number of under 18 by the total 
population of the district. Population density was also calculated by the author, and this 
was done by dividing the total population of the district by the total number of square 
miles in the district.    
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Proxy Variables 
 
Mafia presence is a difficult variable to measure; there is no list that keeps track of 
Mafia members and associates, nor are members willing to come forward and label their 
true means of employment on the Census, and there are no end-of-the-year financial 
reports to request from them.  Initially, the method of measuring Mafia presence was to 
obtain the names and addresses of those Italian-Mafia members who were arrested under 
the RICO Act, pinpoint their addresses on a map, and use the results as a measure of 
Mafia presence.  However, searching through court records became very expensive and 
time-consuming, with few results.  The addresses of those Mafia members arrested under 
the RICO act were not easily accessible, so, the Mafia presence variable was constructed 
as a dummy variable as a way to approximately measure Mafia presence.  The 
neighborhoods that are most popularly rumored to have dense Italian-American Mafia 
presence were used to gauge Mafia presence.  Suttles (1972) studied neighborhoods that 
were rumored to have Mafia presence and this is where the idea stems from for this 
study.  The following neighborhoods that are rumored to have Mafia presence in New 
York City were matched to their corresponding community districts:  Howard Beach, 
Queens can be found in Queens community district 10, Todt Hill, Staten Island matches 
with Staten Island Community District 2; Princess Bay, Staten Island matches with Staten 
Island community district 3; Bensonhurst, Brooklyn is in Brooklyn community district 
11; Dyker Heights, Brooklyn is in Brooklyn community district 10; Arthur Avenue, 
Bronx is found in the Bronx community district 6; Little Italy, Manhattan is in Manhattan 
community district 2 (Sorrentino and Krase 2000).  These neighborhoods were all labeled 
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with a “1” and all other community districts were labeled as “0,” to achieve the proxy 
variable for Mafia presence.    
A problem with this approach is that a neighborhood’s reputations for a strong Mafia 
presence may be based on old rumors and not represent its current status.  Therefore, also 
serving as proxy variables are the Percent Russian Foreign-born and the Percent Italian 
Foreign-born as measures of organized crime presence.  The Percent Russian Foreign-
born was chosen to represent the growing populations of the Russian Mafia in Brooklyn 
and other parts of New York City. The Percent Italian Foreign-born was chosen to 
represent the Italian born immigrants in New York City and Brooklyn.  The New York 
City Mafia families only allow Italians to join as full members, so potential recruits are 
most likely in areas with strong Italian reputations.  Russian organized crime represents 
the second-largest ethnic-based organized crime group in New York City, so it is useful 
to include it as it can offer additional representation of social control through organized 
crime (Finckenauer and Waring 1998). 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Next, the street crime in New York City will be assessed.  For the purpose of this 
project street crime will be considered assaults, robberies and homicides as these seem to 
be the offenses that people most often turn to in deciding if a neighborhood is safe.  It is 
recognized that some of these offenses, especially those involving intimate partners, 
occur in homes or other indoor locations (Bursik and Grasmik 2001).    
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 Data from the New York City Police Department were retrieved for the years 
1998 and 2001.  The crime statistics chosen were assault, robbery, and homicide; these 
crimes were chosen because they form a template for violent and public crimes.  
According to social disorganization theory, a crime has to be somewhat public in order 
for citizens to have social control over said crime; robbery is most often a crime that 
occurs in public spaces.  These numbers for each crime were averaged for the years 1998 
and 2001, the aim is to account for year to year fluctuations in crime occurrences; this 
was accomplished by adding the two years together and dividing by two times the 
population from the year 2000.  The crime rate was calculated by adding together the 
total number of assaults, robberies and homicides divided by the total population and 
multiplied by 100,000, this way the crime rate reflects units per 100,000.  The crime 
statistics were available by precincts in the five boroughs: Manhattan is home to 22 
precincts, Brooklyn divides into 23 precincts, Queens 16 precincts, the Bronx has 12 
precincts and Staten Island has 3 precincts; making  a total of 76 New York City 
precincts.   
 The issue of matching community districts and police precincts was easily solved 
because previous research had called for the same procedure, and in the interest of saving 
time it was easier to use the “ready-made” match devised by Golub, Johnson and Dunlap 
(2006).  They matched the community districts with police precincts during the same 
time frame that we are assessing here.  An illustration of the chart constructed by Golub 
et al. is visible in Table 1.    
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Methods 
  
Once the data were collected, multivariate regression analyses were performed.  
Initially, there was multicolinearity between the economic variables (VIF>4.0).  These 
included: % female headed households, % owner occupied housing, median income, % 
education of high school or higher, and % of public assistance.  Two of the variables 
(female headed households, public assistance) have positive relationships to crime and 
the other three variables (median income, high school education and home ownership) 
have negative relationships.  To rectify this, all of the aforementioned SES variables were 
converted into Z scores, and then the variables median income, high school or higher and 
home ownership were multiplied by -1.  After this procedure, all of the SES variables 
were combined to create an index called “Low SES2.”  A test for multicollinearity was 
run again using the new variable LowSES2 and all VIF scores were within a normal 
range (VIF<4), indicating that the problem of multicollinearity had been fixed.   
Finally, Ordinary Least Squares Regression models were estimated for the crime 
statistics.  Each model included a crime statistic variable as the dependent variable.  The 
first analysis was conducted for assault, followed by robbery, homicide and the total 
crime rate (robbery, homicide and assault, units per 100,000), in that order.  The 
independent variables used for each model were the neighborhood characteristics: low 
SES2, % Italian, population change, % under 18 and Mafia presence.   
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Table 1 
 
Community Districts and Precincts 
 
NYPD Precincts    Community Districts   Neighborhoods   
Manhattan 
1    1      Battery Park, Tribeca 
5   3      Lower East Side, Chinatown 
6    2      Greenwich Village, Soho 
7    3      Lower East Side, Chinatown 
9    4      Chelsea, Clinton 
13    6      Stuyvesant Town, Turtle Bay 
14    5      Midtown Business District 
17    6      Stuyvesant Town, Turtle Bay 
18    4      Chelsea, Clinton 
19    8      Upper East Side 
20   7      West Side, Upper West Side 
22         Central Park 
23    11     East Harlem 
24    7      West Side, Upper West Side 
25    11      East Harlem 
26    9      Manhattanville, Hamilton Heights 
28    10      Central Harlem 
30    9      Manhattanville, Hamilton Heights 
32   10      Central Harlem 
33    12      Washington Heights, Inwood 
34    12      Washington Heights, Inwood 
 
The Bronx 
40   1      Melrose, Mott Haven, Port Morris 
41   2     Hunts Point, Longwood 
42    3      Morrisania, Crotona Park East 
43    9      Soundview, Parkchester 
44    4      Highbridge, Concourse Village 
45    10     Throgs Neck, Co-op City, Pelham Bay 
46    5      University Heights, Fordham, Mt.Hope 
47    12     Wakefield, Williamsbridge 
48    6      East Tremont, Belmont 
49    11     Pelham Parkway, Morris Park, Laconia 
50    8      Riverdale, Kingsbridge, Marble Hill 
52    7      Bedford Park, Norwood, Fordham 
 
Brooklyn 
60    13      Coney Island, Brighton Beach 
61   15      Sheepshead Bay, Gerritsen Beach 
62    11      Bensonhurst, Bath Beach 
63    18      Canarsie, Flatlands 
66    12      Borough Park, Ocean Parkway 
67    17      East Flatbush, Rugby, Farragut 
68    10      Bay Ridge, Dyker Heights 
69    18      Canarsie, Flatlands 
70    14      Flatbush, Midwood 
71    9      Crown Heights South, Wingate 
72    7      Sunset Park, Windsor Terrace 
73    16      Brownsville, Ocean Hill 
 
75    5      East New York, Starrett City 
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76    6      Park Slope, Carroll Gardens 
77    8      Crown Heights North 
78    6      Park Slope, Carroll Gardens 
79    3      Bedford Stuyvesant 
81    3      Bedford Stuyvesant 
83    4      Bushwick 
84    2      Brooklyn Heights, Fort Greene 
88    2      Brooklyn Heights, Fort Greene 
90    1      Williamsburg, Greenpoint 
94    1      Williamsburg, Greenpoint 
 
Queens 
100    14      The Rockaways, Broad Channel 
101    14      The Rockaways, Broad Channel 
102    9      Woodhaven, Richmond Hill 
103    12      Jamaica, St. Albans, Hollis 
104    5      Ridgewood, Glendale, Maspeth 
105    13     Queens Village, Rosedale 
106    10     Ozone Park, Howard Beach 
107    8     Fresh Meadows, Briarwood 
108    2      Sunnyside, Woodside 
109    7      Flushing, Bay Terrace 
110    4      Elmhurst, South Corona 
111    11      Bayside, Douglaston, Little Neck 
112    6      Forest Hills, Rego Park 
113    12      Jamaica, St. Albans, Hollis 
114    1      Astoria, Long Island City 
115    3      Jackson heights, North Corona 
 
Staten Island 
120    1      Stapleton, Port Richmond 
122    2      New Springville, South Beach 
123    3      Tottenville, Woodrow, Great Kills 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
Four models were run to determine the effects of the Italian-American Mafia 
presence on neighborhood public safety.  Each model has an N of 59.  The mean rate for 
assault is 369.07 (SD= 255.10) indicating that on average, about 369 assaults occur per 
100,000 residents in each community district in a given year.  The mean rate for robbery 
is 455.25 (SD=257.42), showing that the reported level of robberies are greater than that 
for assaults.  The mean rate for homicide is substantially less with 8.86 per 100,000 
(SD=7.42).  The crime rate has a mean of 821.54 (SD=487.48), so on average, about 822 
crimes (assaults, homicides and robberies) occurred per 100,000 people in New York 
City for the years 1998-2001.   Percent Italian has a mean of 1.31 (SD=.73) and Percent 
Russian has a mean of 1.25 (SD .71) indicating that on average each community district 
has about 1% Russian and 1% Italian foreign-born.  Table 2 shows the standard 
deviations and the means for the neighborhood characteristics and the crime statistics for 
New York City.  Table 3 compares the crime statistics for rumored mafia neighborhoods 
in New York City with the means of the crime statistics for all 59 community districts.   
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Neighborhood Characteristics and Crime Statistics in New York 
City 1998-2001 
 
 
Variable                                    Mean                    Standard Deviation                N                                
Assault 369.07 255.10 59 
Robbery  455.68 257.42 59 
Homicide 8.86 7.42 59 
Crime Rate 821.54 487.48 59 
Percent Italian 1.31 .72 59 
Mafia Presence .14 .35 59 
Percent Russian 1.25 .71 59 
Percent Under 18 24.70 7.61 59 
Density 43519.12 25437.03 59 
LowSES2 .00 4.40 59 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Crime Statistics for Rumored Mafia Neighborhoods in New York City, 1998-2001. 
 
 
Rumored           Community               Percent        Assault     Robbery    Homicide   Crime 
Neighborhood      District                   Italian          Rate*        Rate*         Rate*        Rate* 
Arthur Avenue Bronx 6 3.10 623 660 24 1307 
Howard Beach Queens 10 5.10 211 349 4 564 
Todt Hill Staten Island 2 11.40 117 90 2 209 
Princess Bay Staten Island 3 20.40 38 19 1 58 
Bensonhurst Brooklyn 11 13.20 193 300 4 497 
Dyker Heights Brooklyn 10 6.80 150 190 0 340 
Little Italy Manhattan 2 3.80 194 395 3 592 
All ** All** N/A 369.07 455.68 8.86 821.54 
       
*Rates are per 100,000 people 
** Rates are the means for all 59 community districts 
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Correlations 
Table 4 shows several notable correlations between the variables. There is a 
positive and significant correlation between LowSES2 and crime rate (r=.616). This 
indicates that when there are more residents of lower socioeconomic status, a higher 
crime rate is likely. Percent Russian has a significant and negative relationship with the 
crime rate (r=-.251).  This indicates that the higher percent Russian residents, the lower 
the crime rate.  The magnitude for this relationship is low but the primary hypothesis is 
supported because the Russians have a sizeable organized crime group in New York City.  
This result potentially indicates that the presence of their crime groups has negative 
effects on the crime rate.  There is a significant and negative correlation between percent 
Italian and crime rate (r=-.378).  Though the magnitude for this relationship is low, it 
suggests the possibility that the higher the percent of Italian residents, the lower the crime 
rate will be.  This relationship does support the primary hypothesis of the thesis.   
 The proxy variable Mafia presence has a significant and negative correlation with 
robbery (-.223), indicating that as Mafia presence in neighborhoods increases, robbery 
decreases.  This correlation supports the initial hypothesis that Mafia presence decreases 
crime.  Other significant correlations include percent Russian (r= -.251) and percent 
Italian (r= -.391) which are both significantly and inversely correlated with robbery.  This 
suggests that the higher the percent of Russian or Italian residents, the lower the instances 
of robbery.  Notably, percent Italian is correlated at a higher magnitude than the percent 
Russian.  LowSES2, however, has the strongest correlation with robbery (r=.467). 
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 The significant variables most strongly correlated with assault were percent under 
18 (r=.490) and LowSES2 (r=.699).  Percent Russian (r= -.238) and percent Italian (-
.339) were also significantly correlated with assault, although negatively and at a lower 
magnitude.  This suggests the possibility that the percent Russian and percent Italian do 
have an effect on the amount of reported assault.  
 Many of these correlations seem to support the hypothesis that Mafia presence has 
a negative impact on crime.  An OLS regression was performed to determine the stability 
of these relationships with other variables controlled.  Table 4 shows the zero-order 
correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) for the independent and dependent variables.   
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Table 4 
 
Correlation Coefficients  
                         
                                                                             Pearson’s r 
 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10
X1 -- -.113 -.115 -.109 .795* .-.064 .490 .179 .677 .332* 
X2 -.113 -- .215 -.118 -.164 .420* -.238 -.203* -.251 -.251* 
X3 -.115 .215 -- -.362* -.339* .452* -.339* -.391 -.316* -.378* 
X4 -.109 -.118 -.362* -- .236* -.028 .079 .144 .129 .146 
X5 .795* -.164 -.339* .236* -- -.120 .699* .467* .830* .616* 
X6 -.064 .420* .452* -.028 -.120 -- -.189 -.223* -.181 -.210 
X7 .490* -.238* -.339* .079 .699* -.189 -- .757 .828 .779 
X8 .179 -.251* -.391* .144 .467* -.223* .757 -- .661 .796 
X9 .677* -.203 -.316* .129 .830* -.181 .828 .661 -- .464 
X10 .332* -.251* -.378* .146 .616* -.210 .779 .796 .464 -- 
           
 
X1= Percent Under 18    X6= Mafia Presence 
X2= Percent Russian    X7= Assault 
X3= Percent Italian    X8= Robbery 
X4= Density     X9= Homicide 
X5= LowSES2     X10=Crime Rate 
 
* indicates statistically significant, p<.05 
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Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
 Model 1 uses assault as the dependent variable.  After conducting an ANOVA, 
F=10.861 and is significant at p≤000.  This indicates that model 1 is a good fit.  In the 
OLS model, two of the predictor variables were statistically significant, density and 
LowSES2.    For density, the coefficient is B= -.002, significant at p≤.046, indicating a 
negative relationship to assault.  As population density increases by 1 unit, assaults will 
decrease by .002.  LowSES2 had a coefficient of B= 54.275 at the .000 significance level, 
this indicates a positive relationship between low socioeconomic status and assault. As 
LowSES2 increases by 54.275, assaults will also increase by one unit.   The standardized 
coefficient for LowSES2 is .945 and for population density beta= -.233 showing that 
LowSES2 has a much stronger effect on assault.  The regression for model 1 indicates 
that the measures of organized crime do not have a significant relationship with assault.  
Table 5 highlights the B coefficients and R2 for model 1.   
 In Model 2, homicide is the dependent variable.  The ANOVA showed F=20.466 
with a significance level of p≤ .000. This score shows that model 2 is also a good fit.   In 
the OLS model, the only variable considered significant is LowSES2 with coefficient B= 
1.34 at a .000 significance level, indicating a positive relationship between low 
socioeconomic status and homicide in New York City.   As low socioeconomic status 
increases, homicide also increases.  This model indicates that low socioeconomic status is 
the most influential factor on homicide in New York City.  Again, none of the measures 
for organized crime appeared significant (p<.05) in this model, indicating that organized 
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crime does not have a strong relationship to homicide.   See Table 5 for a detailed look at 
the B coefficients and R2 for Model 2.   
For model 3, the dependent variable is robbery.  The ANOVA showed F=5.830 
and the predictors were statistically significant at .000, indicating that the model is a good 
fit.  In the OLS model, two variables appeared as significant, LowSES2 and percent 
under 18.  LowSES2 has a coefficient B= 53.049 at a .000 significance level, this 
indicates that LowSES2 has a direct relationship with robbery in New York City.  As 
LowSES2 increases by 53.049, robbery will also increase by one unit.  Percent under 18 
has a coefficient of B= -20.746 at a .004 significance level, indicating a negative 
relationship between % under 18 and robbery in New York City.  As the percent under 18 
decreases, robbery will increase.  The standardized coefficients (betas) are .916 for 
LowSES2 and -.614 for percent under 18, this shows that LowSES2 has the greatest 
impact on robbery.   See Table 5 for highlights of the B coefficients and R2 for model 3.   
Model 4 used Crime Rate as the dependent variable. The ANOVA shows F= 
9.018 (p≤.000) indicating the model is a good fit.  The coefficients that are significant are 
LowSES2 (B=112.721, p≤.000) and percent under 18 (B= -34.630, p≤.006). LowSES2 
has a positive relationship to the crime rate.  As the crime rate increases by one unit, 
LowSES2 increases by 112.721.  The standardized coefficient for LowSES2 is larger 
than 1 which usually indicates multicollinearity.  When the offending variable (under 18) 
was removed, there was no change in the results.  The original results are kept, despite 
the high standardized coefficient.  The percent under 18 has a negative relationship with 
the crime rate.  As percent under 18 decreases by 34.630, the crime rate increases by one 
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unit.  The standardized coefficients indicate that LowSES2 (beta= .1.027) has the 
strongest effect on the crime rate compared to the percent under 18 (beta= -.541).  Again, 
in this model, the proxy variables for Mafia presence are not statistically significant.  
Table 5 shows the B coefficients and R2 for model 4.   
 Density is significant in model 1, percent under 18 is significant in models 3 and 
4, and LowSES2 is significant in all 4 of the models.  LowSES2 is the variable with the 
strongest effect on the dependent variables in each of the models.  Next we will look at 
the possible reasons for the significance of these variables. 
 
Table 5 
 
OLS Regressions of Assault, Robbery, Homicide and Crime Rate in New York City 
1998-2001, N=59 
        
 
Variables          Unstandardized Coefficients (B)/Standardized Coefficients (Beta)   
 Model 1:  
Assault** 
Model 2: 
 Homicide** 
Model 3:  
Robbery** 
Model 4: 
 Crime rate** 
LowSES2 54.275*  (.945) 1.374*  (.823) 53.049* (.916) 112.721* (1.027) 
Density -.002*  (-.233) -2.470E-5 (-.085) -.002 (-.437) -.004  (-.223) 
Percent Italian -39.757 (-.133) -.361(-.035) -70.819 (-.136) -94.587 (-.141) 
Mafia presence -.025 (.000) -1.026 (-.048) -4.358 (.006) -9.133 (-.006) 
Percent Russian -43.734 (-.122) -.528 (-.051) -55.044 (-.126) -94.150 (-.137) 
Percent Under18 -10.515 (-.314) .001 (.001) -20.746* (-.614) -34.630*  (-.541) 
R2 .556 .703 .402 .510  
Standard Error 255.10 7.42 257.42 487.48 
* indicates variable is statistically significant, p<.05. 
** indicates model is significant 
parentheses indicate standardized coefficient (Beta) 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 
Socio-economic status has long been a bench mark for high crime or lack of crime 
(Park and Burgess, 1925; Shaw and McKay, 1969; DeSena, 1994; Patillo, 1998; Bursik 
and Grasmik 2001), and it is not surprising that this variable had strong and consistent 
influence on the various crimes and crime rates in New York City.  Consistently turning 
up with a significance level of p<.000, low socioeconomic status was the most influential 
predictor of assault, robbery, homicide and the overall crime rate.  
 Percent under 18 also has negative and significant effects on robbery and the 
crime rate in New York City.  This significance is not surprising because crime is 
typically low in areas that have a large number of children. This does not support the 
primary hypothesis of the thesis, but it does support the theory that social control keeps 
neighborhoods safer.  Families with children are more likely to personally insure that the 
area they live in remains safe.    
 This significance of the negative correlation of percent Italian shown in Table 3 is 
interesting and deserves a closer look.  This does not necessarily have to mean that if 
there are Italian immigrants in New York City they will be involved in crime or a threat 
to any given neighborhood, but it does mean that there is a negative relationship between 
foreign-born Italian-Americans in a particular area and the crime statistics chosen for this 
project.  As the percent foreign-born Italian increases, assault, robbery, homicide and 
crime rate decrease.  While it is not the most significant correlation compared to some 
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other independent variables, it is interesting that a relationship exists.  Now obviously, 
this result does not indicate that Mafia presence has anything to do with neighborhood 
public safety, because being born in Italy does not mean that you become involved with 
the Mafia in the U.S. However, there is a high incidence of native-born Italians joining or 
being indoctrinated into Mafia activities in the United States, and this is what makes this 
result most intriguing.  
 The proxy variable Mafia presence had no significance relating to assault, robbery 
homicide and crime rate in New York City.  This could be because the variable does not 
accurately measure Mafia presence; there is no easy way to measure the activity or 
membership of the Mafia at the neighborhood level.  Another reason for the difficulty in 
assessing Mafia presence could be the strict enforcement of the RICO laws during the 
1980s and 1990s.  The many arrests of those involved in racketeering operations may 
have changed the density of the Mafia presence in neighborhoods, perhaps there are less 
Mafia members now and, therefore, the families have less influence on their historic 
strongholds.   
 There are many weaknesses in this study. The crime statistics may not represent 
actual crime because I did not use all of the reported crimes in New York City, and not 
all crime is discovered or reported.  Therefore, the actual crime rate may be significantly 
higher in some communities.  The neighborhood characteristics chosen may not represent 
the communities in the appropriate way because what appears in the Census may not be 
an accurate picture of what is going on in the community; especially since the Census is 
not conducted annually.  In urban areas like New York City, neighborhoods and 
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communities tend to change more rapidly than other types of cities.  Community districts 
are broader than neighborhoods and may include smaller areas that are homogenous with 
respect to organized crime.  
 Although, there are many flaws in this study, it seems to be a good starting point 
for future research.  Further investigations on this topic should focus on obtaining a more 
accurate measure of Mafia presence, either collecting addresses of those arrested under 
the RICO act as initially planned or finding another more valid measure of Mafia 
presence.  In addition to this, it would be beneficial to see what happens if smaller 
community units are analyzed, like zip code, area code or census tracts.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
The literature suggests that neighborhoods with organized criminal networks 
would have lower crime rates than other neighborhoods or communities, because of the 
social control their organization exerts on residents and visitors.  The strictly organized 
Italian-American Mafia seems to have characteristics that would translate throughout the 
neighborhood: People will not participate in overt illegal behaviors because they do not 
know who is watching, and the fear of what the Mafia might do keeps residents and 
visitors to the neighborhood relatively well-behaved.  Using crime statistics from the 
NYPD and census data for neighborhood characteristics, four linear regressions were 
calculated.  The results indicate that low socioeconomic status is the main factor 
explaining neighborhood crime rate variations in New York City.  The percent of the 
population under 18 and density were also listed as influential factors for some variables.  
The percent of foreign-born Italians was noted as significant in the correlation models, 
though it is not yet clear what this might truly indicate.  The proxy variable for Mafia 
presence was not significant, and this can either be due to inaccuracies of the 
measurement of the variable or a true decrease in the influence of Mafia presence after 
the string of RICO arrests in the 1980s and 1990s.   The results imply that Mafia presence 
does not influence neighborhood social control, but they do reinforce social 
disorganization theory.   The foundation of this theory is neighborhood stability; the more 
unstable a neighborhood is, the more susceptible the neighborhood is to crime and 
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dysfunction.  Factors like low socioeconomic status and density influence neighborhood 
stability.  Future research should attempt to have more accurate representations of Mafia 
presence and neighborhood characteristics.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
REFERENCES 
 
 
 
 
AP, Associated Press (2007, Nov. 8). Mafia's 'ten commandments' revealed. CNN: Cable 
News Network. 
 
Block, A. (1980). East side west side: organizing crime in New York 1930-1950. 
Swansea, Wales: University College Cardiff. 
 
Block, A., & Chambliss, W. J. (1981). Organizing Crime. New York, NY: Elsevier. 
 
Boggs, S.L (1971).Formal and informal crime control: an exploratory study of urban, 
suburban and rural orientations. The Sociological Quarterly. 12, 319-327. 
 
Bohlen, C. (1989, Aug. 28). In Bensonhurst, grief mixed with shame and blunt bias. The 
New York Times. (New York, NY) p. A1. 
 
Bursik, R. J. , & Grasmick, H.G. (2001). Neighborhoods and crime. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books. 
 
Crutchfield, R.D., Geerken, M.R., & Gove, W.R. (1982). Crime rate and social 
integration: the impact of metropolitan mobility. Criminology. 20, 467-478. 
 
DeSena, J.N. (1994).Women: The gatekeepers of urban neighborhoods. Journal of Urban 
Affairs. 16, 271. 
 
DeStefano, G. (2007). An offer we can't refuse: The Mafia in the mind of America. New 
York, NY: Faber and Faber. 
 
Dillon, S. (1992, Oct. 25). Brooklyn's neighbors to the mob. The New York Times. (New 
York, NY) Section 1, p. 35.   
 
Finckenhauer, J.O. & Waring, E.J. (1998). Russian Mafia in America: Immigration, 
Culture and Crime. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press. 
 
Golub, Johnson and Dunlap. 2006.  Smoking marijuana in public: the spatial and policy 
shift in New York City arrests, 1992-2003. Harm Reduction Journal 3:22.  
 
GPO, Government Printing Office Access (2008). Public and Private Laws. Retrieved 
December 5, 2008, from Government Printing Office Access Web site: 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/plaws/index.html
43 
 
Heitgard, J.L., & Bursik, R.J. (1987). Extracommunity dynamics and the ecology of 
delinquency. American Journal of Sociology. 92, 775-787. 
 
Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of delinquency. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Hunter, Albert. (1985). "Private, Parochial and Public Social Orders: The Problem of 
Crime and Incivility in Urban Communities." Pp. 230-42 in The Challenge of 
Social Control: Citizenship and Institution Building in Modern Society, edited by 
Gerald Suttles and Mayer Zald. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing. 
 
Ianni, F. A. J. , & Reuss-Ianni, E. (1972). A family business. New York, NY: Russell 
Sage Foundation. 
 
Jacobs, J.B., Panarella, C., & Worthington, J. (1994). Busting the mob: United states v. 
cosa nostra. New York, NY: New York University Press 
 
Kornhauser, R. R. (1979). Social sources of delinquency: An appraisal of analytic 
models. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Krohn , M.D. (1986).The web of conformity: The network approach to the explanation of 
delinquent behavior. Social Problems. 33, 581-593. 
 
Liska, A.E., & Baccaglini, W. (1990). Feeling safe by comparison: crime in the 
newspapers. Social Problems. 37, 360-374. 
 
Maas, P. (1999). Underboss: Sammy the bull Gravano's story of life in the Mafia. New 
York, NY: Harper Collins. 
 
McIllwain, J.S. (1999).Organized Crime: A social network approach. Crime, Law and 
Social Change. 32, 301-323. 
 
NYCDCP, New York City Department of City Planning (2008). New York: A City of 
Neighborhoods. Retrieved November 21, 2008, from New York City Department 
of City Planning Web site: 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/neighbor/neigh.shtml
 
NYPD, New York City Police Department (2008). Crime Statistics. Retrieved November 
21, 2008, from New York City Police Department Web site: 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/crime_prevention/crime_statistics.shtml 
 
Organized crime. (n.d.). The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 
Fourth Edition. Retrieved July 29, 2008, from Dictionary.com website: 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/organized crime
44 
 
Orvis, G.P. and Rush  J.P. (2000).  “Organized Crime” Chapter 24 in, DuPont-Morales, 
M.A., Hooper, M., & Schmidt, J.H. (2000). Handbook of criminal justice 
administration. New York, NY: CRC Press, Inc. 
 
Park, R.E., & Burgess, E. (1925). The City. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Patillo, M.E. (1998).Sweet mothers and gangbangers: Managing crime in a black middle-
class neighborhood. Social Forces. 76, 747-774. 
 
Sampson, R.J. (1985).Neighborhood and crime: The structural determinants of personal 
victimization. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency. 22, 7-40 
 
Sampson, R.J., & Groves, B.W. (1989). Community structure and crime: testing social-
disorganization theory. The American Journal of Sociology. 94, 774-802. 
 
SDCNY, Southern District Court of New York (2008). Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records. Retrieved November 22, 2008, from Southern District Court of New 
York Web site: http://www1.nysd.uscourts.gov/pacer.php 
 
Shapiro, S.P. (1987).The social control of impersonal trust. The American Journal of 
Sociology. 93, 623-658. 
 
Shaw, C.R., & McKay, H.D. (1969). Juvenile delinquency and urban areas: A study of 
rates of delinquency in relation to differential characteristics of local 
communities in American cities. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Shelley, L. L. (1995). Transnational organized crime: An imminent threat to the nation-
state?  The Journal of Public Affairs.  48, 463-490. 
 
Skogan, W. G. , & Maxfield, M. G. (1981). Coping with crime: Individual and 
neighborhood reactions. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Sorrentino, F.M & Krase, J. (2000). The Review of Italian American Studies. New York, 
NY: Lexington Books. 
 
Suttles, G. D. (1972). The social construction of communities. Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Taylor, R.B., & Hale, M. (1986). Criminology: Testing alternative models of fear of 
crime. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. 77, 151. 
 
Whyte, W.F. (1941). “Corner boys: A study of clique behavior.” American Journal of 
Sociology.  46, 647. 
45 
 46 
